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Abstract 
 
We examine stock returns following unexpected corporate announcements that are described as 
profit warnings. Warnings fall into two classes: those that include a new earnings forecast, and those 
that offer only the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. We find significant 
negative post-event abnormal returns in the first three months following both types of warning. We 
also find that abnormal returns are significantly more negative following qualitative warnings. This 
suggests that underreaction is more significant when news is imprecise. This in turn has implications 
for how underreaction might be explained. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Key words: Profit warnings; Market efficiency; Anomalies 
JEL classification: G12; G14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author:  
Professor George Bulkley, email: I.G.Bulkley@exeter.ac.uk 
1. Introduction 
    Evidence that stock returns exhibit momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) has attracted 
considerable attention. It is an anomaly that is proving robust (Rouwenhorst, 1998), and one that is 
particularly difficult to rationalize using conventional asset-pricing models. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) reject the hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1998) that momentum is a consequence of cross-
section differences in expected returns and Fama and French (1996) conclude that their three-factor 
model cannot explain momentum. This difficulty in explaining momentum as a failure to properly 
control for risk has led to the suggestion that momentum is observed because the market’s reaction 
to news is drawn out over time, rather than immediate as expected in an efficient market. However 
no clear verdict on the underreaction hypothesis has emerged from the event study literature, in part 
because of reservations about the methodology that is employed in many studies. 
  
     A number of the concerns about event studies stem from the fact that results often rely on 
measures of abnormal returns over several years, and inference based on long-term abnormal 
performance is particularly controversial (Fama, 1998). A second area of concern for some 
observers is that events are often not just information but are also decisions that have direct 
consequences for cash flows and the risk characteristics of the firm (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).  
 
     In this paper we test for abnormal performance following profit warnings. Profit warnings are an 
interesting event to investigate because they conform closely to the model of a noisy public signal 
about a specific and imminent realization, the quarterly earnings announcement. These 
characteristics mitigate the concerns about event studies expressed above. If there is an 
underreaction to warnings, and if abnormal returns are driven by the realization that corrects any 
initially biased reaction, then abnormal performance should be visible within two to three months. 
Approximately 90% of profit warnings precede the earnings announcement, to which they refer, by 
less than three months (see Table 3 below). Profit warnings are also a pure information event, and 
not a decision that has direct material consequences for the firm. Although there are other examples 
of pure information events, for example stock splits and exchange listings, they do not share the 
advantage that they are news about an imminent realization.  
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     The advantage that warnings are an uncontaminated signal about a specific realization is 
reinforced by the sheer size of their initial impact on the market. Stock prices drop on average by 
approximately 22% in the announcement window for a profit warning, an initial impact that is much 
larger than that usually observed in event studies. For example it is a much larger fall than the 
average response to a large negative surprise in the scheduled quarterly earnings announcement. 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) report that the decile of stocks with the most disappointing earnings 
surprise delivered abnormal returns of approximately -2% in the announcement window.  
 
     Profit warnings divide into two rather different types of information event in a way that allows us 
to also investigate whether the quality of the information released has any bearing on the market’s 
reaction. One class of warnings consists of those that include a prediction for the forthcoming 
earnings announcement, and we will refer to these as quantitative warnings. The other consists of 
those that offer only the qualitative guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. We 
will examine the announcement returns, and post-event returns, separately for each type of warning. 
These two different types of event offer the opportunity to test not only whether the market 
underreacts to news, but also whether the scale of any underreaction is related to the quality of the 
information released. This in turn has implications for how underreaction might be explained. 
 
     Profit warnings are an example of the discretionary disclosure of information by firms and 
therefore, as well as making a contribution to the general debate about underreaction, they are an 
event that is of particular interest in the context of the resurgence of interest in the question of how 
disclosures should be regulated (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Grossman, 1981; Boot and Thakor, 2001; 
Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). The two classes of warning allow us to test the well-known result in 
this literature (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981) that a firm will only fail to fully disclose its information in 
the worst possible state, and the market will therefore interpret lack of full disclosure as particularly 
bad news. We test whether qualitative warnings are indeed worse news than warnings that include 
an earnings forecast, and whether the market interprets them as such. We discuss below whether 
there is any evidence that firms that issue qualitative warnings are simply less well informed. 
 
     The sample investigated in this study consists of announcements that were described by CNN as 
a profit warning. We find significant negative average abnormal returns on stocks purchased two 
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days after a profit warning, and held for the next three months. Post-event abnormal returns are 
significantly more negative following a qualitative warning, -9.6% over the three months, than 
following a quantitative warning, approximately -2% over the same horizon. We discuss in Section 
4 how these figures compare with those reported in studies that find evidence of post-earnings-
announcement drift.  
 
          The substantial difference between post-event abnormal returns for the two types of warnings 
is evidence that underreaction is exacerbated when news is imprecise. This points towards a model 
of underreaction where the precision of the new information is a determinant of the scale of 
underreaction, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). Underreaction to public news in that 
model is a consequence of an overconfidence in private information that leads to a bias in the 
perception and processing of news. Intuitively, it is easier for an overconfident investor to cling to 
prior beliefs in the face of a qualitative warning (or more precise signal) than when confronted with 
a new numerical forecast (or more precise signal).  
 
     Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Skinner (1994) investigate why firms choose to issue profit 
warnings before a bad earnings outcome. Skinner argues that managers may issue warnings to deter 
shareholder litigation and because they believe the market punishes managers who appear to delay 
bad news. Kasznik and Lev (1995) report that approximately half the firms that have a large 
negative earnings surprise issue a profit warning. They interviewed managers and report that one 
reason managers gave for not issuing profit warnings before bad earnings outcomes was that they 
believed that the market overreacts to profit warnings. The results reported here suggest that this fear 
is not well founded. 
 
     In Section 2 profit warnings are described in more detail and descriptive statistics for companies 
that issue warnings are presented. In Section 3 we describe the methodology used for aggregating 
daily returns into monthly abnormal returns and estimating statistical significance. In Section 4 
results are presented for the whole sample and for sub-samples of warnings from firms that are 
matched to the smallest and largest size deciles and highest and lowest book-to-market quintiles. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Profit Warnings 
 
     A profit warning is a description that analysts and journalists give to an unexpected corporate 
announcement that earnings for a specified future quarter will fall short of current expectations. The 
data set studied here consists of public statements by US companies that are described as profit 
warnings on the CNN site, www.cnn.com/markets/IRC/warnings.htlm between February 15th 1998 
and December 31st 2000. CNN acquires its data from Briefing.com and the start of the data set used 
here is determined by the earliest date the data are available from Briefing.com.  
 
     This database includes the date of the warning, the earnings announcement that is the subject of 
the warning, the previous earning estimate and a revised forecast from the firm. The revised forecast 
may be quantitative, either a point estimate or a range, or may include only the qualitative statement 
that earnings or revenues will fall short of current expectations. Working with CNN data introduces 
an objective criterion for the inclusion of a firm in the data set, allowing replication and avoiding 
any sample selection issues. Examples of the data as reported by CNN are given in the Appendix. 
 
     It is common to observe repeated warnings from the same firm. Repeated warnings for the same 
quarterly earnings announcement may be issued, and some firms are observed issuing repeated 
warnings for consecutive quarterly announcements. One firm issued seventeen warnings in less than 
three years. Repeated warnings are excluded from the sample because overlapping multi-month 
returns mean that their inclusion would result in a double counting of returns from some firms and 
hence biased statistical inference. For the remainder of the paper all descriptive statistics and 
analysis will be for the sample in which repeated warnings are excluded. This sample consists of 
429 qualitative warnings and 1,584 quantitative warnings. 
 
    The distribution across quarters can be seen in Fig. 1.  
 
[ Figure 1 ] 
 
     The distribution of warning firms across SIC industrial divisions is reported in Table 1. In view 
of the particular importance of the IT and Telecomm industries in the sample period, data for these 
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is reported separately from the remainder of the services and transportation divisions, of which they 
are normally a part. 
 
[ Table 1 ] 
 
     The distribution of warning stocks by size and book-to-market is reported in Table 2. The 
construction of the reference portfolios used in this table is described in detail in Section 3 below. 
 
 
[ Table 2 ] 
 
     It is clear from Table 2 that a disproportionately large fraction of profit warnings are from firms 
matched to low book-to-market portfolios. Given the empirical success of book-to-market in 
explaining cross-section stock returns this emphasizes the importance of controlling for book-to-
market when measuring abnormal returns. The distribution of warning stocks across size portfolios 
does not display quite such a pronounced systematic pattern, but still a high percentage of warning 
firms are matched to the smaller size deciles. 
 
     A question raised in the introduction was whether companies that issue qualitative warnings have 
the same information as those that include quantitative earnings forecasts. The time between the 
warning and the actual earnings announcement should be one determinant of the precision of a 
firm’s information about its quarterly announcement, at the date the warning is issued. If 
quantitative warnings were typically issued more frequently as the warning fell closer to the 
earnings announcement then this would be evidence for the hypothesis that they are chosen by 
better-informed companies. However there is no evidence of this in the small timing differences 
seen in Table 3 below, in which we report the distribution of the time between the warning and the 
scheduled earnings announcement to which it refers.  
 
[Table 3 ] 
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 3. Measuring Long-Term Abnormal Performance 
 
     A point estimate of long-term abnormal returns has to be calculated from daily returns data and 
the distribution of this estimator has also to be determined. A number of papers (see, e.g., Blume and 
Stambough, 1983; Roll, 1983; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999) identify 
biases that can arise under the different methodologies that are employed to determine these two 
components of long-term abnormal performance. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) (LBT) show that 
these biases can be minimized by working with buy-and-hold abnormal returns, BHARs, calculated 
using carefully constructed reference portfolios. The point estimate of the BHAR is calculated from 
daily data as the buy-and-hold return on the event stock minus the buy-and-hold return on a 
reference portfolio that consists of firms whose characteristics match those of the event firm. LBT 
recommend evaluating statistical significance using either the bootstrap approach of Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) or the skewness-adjusted t-statistic. We will follow these 
recommendations in the results for post-event abnormal returns reported below. 
 
     LBT do not address the problem of biases induced by a bad model for expected returns and Fama 
(1998) notes that compounding, as for example with BHARs, will also compound model error. 
Therefore he recommends calculating cumulated abnormal returns, CARs, and so we report both 
BHARs and CARs.  
 
     The reference portfolios employed for calculating abnormal returns are fifty size/book-to-market 
portfolios and are constructed as follows. The reference portfolios are formed in two stages in July 
of each year t following a now widely used procedure (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1992). First, in 
June of each year, all NYSE firms are ranked on the basis of their size, measured by market value of 
equity. Size deciles are then created based on this ranking for all NYSE firms. NASDAQ and 
AMEX firms are placed in the appropriate NYSE size decile based on their June market value of 
equity. At the second stage, within each size decile, firms are divided into quintiles based on their 
book-to-market ratios in year t-1. A firm’s book-to-market ratio in year t-1 is measured as the book 
value of common equity (COMPUSTAT data item 20) reported in the firm’s balance sheet for year 
t-1 divided by the market value of common equity in December of year t-1.  
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      A substantial decline in value up to and including the time of the warning is reported below. This 
implies that it is important to match firms based on their market value after the warning. Therefore 
when stocks are matched to reference portfolios this is done using their size measured two days after 
the warning, day w+2. Their book-to-market value is calculated using the t-1 value of book but 
divided by the market value of equity measured at the calendar day corresponding to w+2. A stock 
that issues a warning on a calendar day corresponding to day w is matched to the appropriate 
portfolio for the preceding July1st.  
  
     Returns data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) using the NYSE, 
AMEX, NASDAQ daily files. An important issue in the measurement of buy-and-hold returns is 
how to handle firms that issue warnings and are subsequently delisted. It is assumed, following 
LBT, that the investor places the proceeds from delisted firms, in the reference portfolio. Therefore 
whenever there is a missing daily return, it is replaced with the mean daily return of firms in the 
reference portfolio, and buy-and-hold returns are calculated from this then complete run of daily 
data. Similarly, when a member of a reference portfolio is missing returns data on any day, the 
missing return is replaced by the average daily return on the remaining stocks in the same portfolio.  
 
     Buy-and-hold returns on the reference portfolio for a particular horizon are calculated as follows. 
We first compound the buy-and-hold returns on each stock in the reference portfolio for that same 
horizon and then average across all stocks in the reference portfolio. If a firm i issues a profit 
warning its abnormal return is calculated as the buy-and-hold return on that stock minus the buy-
and-hold return on the reference portfolio. That is , over horizon τ-s, starting on day s is 
calculated as 
τ,,siBHAR
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where Ri,t  is the daily return on security i on day t. There are n securities, subscripted by j, in the 
reference portfolio to which firm i is matched. For each stock, s and τ are measured in event time, 
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that is relative to the warning, so for example if s = w + 2 for different stocks this is a different 
calendar day.  
 
The average return on the m warning stocks over horizon τ-s, starting on day s, , is 
calculated as 
τ,sBHAR
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 For example if s=w+1 and τ=w+101,  , measures the average abnormal return on stocks 
bought one day after the warning and held for the next hundred days.  
τ,sBHAR
 
    The cumulative abnormal return, , on a portfolio of m warning stocks, each subscripted by 
i, and each held from day s until day τ is calculated as 
τ,sCAR
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where  is the mean return on the securities in the reference portfolio for warning stock i on day 
t.  
tRF
 
     In addition to conventional t-tests, two additional methodologies for assessing statistical 
significance of long-term returns are applied. A parametric approach, motivated by the skewness of 
stock returns, is applied to both CARs and BHARs to calculate the skewness-adjusted t-statistic and 
then assess statistical significance using critical values from standard t- tables.  
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 The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is calculated as 
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        A non-parametric approach, recommended by LBT, is to assess statistical significance of 
BHARs using pseudoportfolios to generate the empirical distribution of long-term abnormal returns 
under the null hypothesis. For each firm that issues a profit warning in our sample a firm is 
randomly selected, with replacement, from the matched reference portfolio. Its abnormal return, 
relative to the reference portfolio from which it was drawn, is computed over exactly the same 
calendar horizon as for the warning firm. Average abnormal returns for this matched sample are then 
computed, just as was done for the original sample. This procedure is then repeated 1000 times and 
thereby the empirical distribution of mean long-term abnormal returns under the null is 
approximated. The probability p of obtaining a particular value for abnormal returns, under the null, 
is obtained from this empirical distribution.  
 
     The null hypothesis tested is that the mean long-term return on warning firms, BHARτ , over a 
particular horizon, equals the mean long-term return on randomly drawn firms from the matched 
reference portfolios, over the same horizon.  
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     This hypothesis is rejected at the α significance level if  
BHARτ *ly≤  or BHARτ  . These two values of y*uy≥ * are found by solving 
[ ] [ ]
2
PrPr ** α=≥=≤ uplp yBHARyBHAR  
where BHARp  is the mean abnormal returns on the pseudoportfolios, p = 1….1000. This is a 
computer intensive technique and is only applied to BHARs at the three and six month horizons. 
 
4. Abnormal Returns Following Profit Warnings 
 
    In this Section abnormal returns in a window around the announcement of a profit warning, and 
for different horizons in the following six months, are reported. In the next sub-section abnormal 
returns in the announcement window are reported.  
 
4.1. Abnormal returns in an eleven-day announcement window 
 
    The first period to be examined in detail is from five days before the warning to five days after it. 
In the announcement window simple daily abnormal returns are reported and cumulated. Abnormal 
returns are calculated for each warning stock, relative to its reference portfolio, and the averages of 
these daily returns across all warning stocks are reported in Table 4.  
 
 [ Table 4 ] 
 
    The importance of profit warnings is seen in the cumulative fall in price of approximately 
22% in this announcement window. Returns are more negative for qualitative warnings, -24.7%, 
than for quantitative warnings, -20.7%. We can test whether this difference is statistically 
significant using the t-test of the null that two samples are drawn from the same population. This 
yielded a t-statistic of 2.49, significant at the 1% level. We infer that profit warnings that are not 
accompanied by earnings forecasts are interpreted as worse news on average than those that 
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include specific earnings guidance. This confirms the prediction, reviewed in the introduction, 
that lack of disclosure will be interpreted as particularly bad news (Milgrom, 1981). Whether it 
is fully recognized just how bad news a qualitative warning is will be evident in the next sub-
section. 
 
     A notable feature of these results is the size of the negative returns on the day following the 
warning. However this probably does not reflect a profit opportunity of short selling stocks on the 
day of the warning, but is due to some warnings being issued after markets closed. This inference is 
supported by the fact that almost 25% of the sample actually delivered positive returns on the day 
CNN reported that the warning was issued, and 50% of warning stocks delivered abnormal returns 
of more than -4% on that day. 
 
4.2. Abnormal returns following a profit warning: the next six months 
    In this sub-section abnormal returns are reported for stocks purchased two days after a profit 
warning and held for the next six months. In preliminary work we traced abnormal returns for 
twelve months following the warnings, but there was no evidence of significant abnormal returns in 
the six to twelve months after the warning and therefore we confine results reported here to the first 
six months.  
 
 [ Table 5 ] 
 
4.2.1. Qualitative profit warnings    
     Table 5 shows that purchasing stocks two days after qualitative warnings are announced delivers 
negative abnormal returns, measured both by CARs and BHARs, for all horizons of between two 
and six months. For example the BHAR is approximately -9.6% after three months and -11.8% after 
six months. In the case of CARs, the results are significant for each successive month, after the first 
month, at the 1% level. For BHARs, after the first month, results are also significant at the 1% level, 
except for month five. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic does generally reduce the statistical 
significance of the results, but the difference is rather marginal for most horizons. Using the non-
parametric pseudoportfolio approach to compute an empirical p value, not a single one of the 
thousand pseudoportfolios delivered over six months a BHAR as low as the -11.8% recorded for this 
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sample of warning stocks. 
 
It is hard to see the BHAR of approximately -9.6% in the first three months following a qualitative 
warning, an annualized abnormal return of -38.4%, as anything other than evidence of underreaction 
to qualitative warnings. Most of the abnormal returns following qualitative warnings accrue in the 
first three months, and this suggests that an important driver of abnormal returns is the earnings 
announcement. Table 3 shows that approximately 92% of earnings announcements have been made 
within three months of qualitative warnings.  
 
4.2.2. Quantitative profit warnings 
Table 5 shows that purchasing stocks two days after quantitative warnings delivers a BHAR of -2% 
and a CAR of -2.2% over three months, both significant at the 5% level under all test statistics 
reported. There is no evidence of significant abnormal returns beyond three months. 
 
 It is interesting to compare these figures to the scale of the widely documented post-earnings-
announcement drift. In order to make this comparison first note that when we report abnormal 
returns they are measured relative to expected returns. However abnormal returns in these studies 
are usually reported as the difference between the returns on the decile portfolio with the highest 
unexpected earnings and the returns on the portfolio with the lowest unexpected earnings. For 
example Bernard and Thomas (1989) report abnormal returns of 6.3% over 60 days, using this 
definition. This is the sum of the outperformance, relative to normal returns, of one portfolio and the 
underperformance, relative to normal returns, of the other. If outperformance and underperformance 
were symmetrical this would imply abnormal returns, as we measure them, of approximately -3.2% 
over 60 days on the decile with the most disappointing earnings outcomes, a similar figure to our 
results for quantitative warnings.  
 
     This evidence suggests that the phenomenon of post-earnings-announcement drift extends to 
unexpected earnings news. Furthermore the estimates of the scale of the drift are rather similar 
despite the fact quantitative warnings are unexpected, have a much larger initial impact, and are a 
noisy forecast of a scheduled announcement. However there is no evidence of additional factors 
driving abnormal returns following quantitative warnings, over and above those following scheduled 
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earnings announcements. In particular there is no evidence that the earnings announcement brings 
further bad news, and therefore we cannot easily explain the underreaction to quantitative warnings 
as a consequence of investors’ failure to rationally update their forecast of quarterly earnings 
following the warning.  
      
      The substantial difference in post-event abnormal returns between warnings that simply state 
that earnings will be below current expectations and those that include a specific forecast has 
implications for what models might explain underreaction. We explore this difference, and its 
implications, in the next sub-section. 
 
4.2.3. Contrasting the reaction to quantitative and qualitative profit warnings     
      
We first test whether the difference between the point estimates of abnormal returns following the 
two classes of warning is statistically significant using the t-test of the null that two samples are 
drawn from the same population. A test applied to the BHAR after three months yields a t-statistic 
of 4.41, and for the BHAR after six months the t-statistic is 3.04, both significant at the 1% level. 
For the CAR the t-statistics are 3.70 at three months and 2.55 at six months, both significant at the 
1% level. We infer that abnormal returns are significantly more negative following qualitative 
warnings.  
 
     More negative abnormal returns following qualitative warnings imply that underreaction is more 
significant when news is simply negative rather than when there is also a quantitative forecast of 
how bad it is likely to be. If qualitative warnings are interpreted as less precise information then this 
result is consistent with a model where underreaction to public news is a consequence of 
overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998). In that model the precision of the public information plays an 
explicit role in determining the size of the bias in investor’s reaction to that news (see equation B16 
in Appendix B of Daniel et al., 1998). Comparing quantitative warningsIntuitively, there is much 
more opportunity for an overconfident investor to downplay the news if it is qualitative (or less 
precise) than if it is accompanied by a quantitative forecast. 
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     We have already reported in sub-section 4.1 that a qualitative warning is initially perceived as 
worse news than a quantitative warning, although the market still underestimates how much worse 
news it is. We next examine the other half of the prediction about disclosure, which is that a 
qualitative warning is particularly bad news. A measure of how bad news a warning is can be 
obtained by cumulating returns from five days before the warning is issued to three months later, by 
which time approximately 90% of earnings announcements will be public. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are -32.2% for qualitative warnings but only -22.7% for quantitative warnings. This suggests 
that qualitative warnings are chosen when the earnings outcome represents a bigger disappointment, 
relative to expectations five days before any warning is issued.  
 
4.3. Does a firm’s size, or whether it is a glamour or value stock, affect announcement and post-
event abnormal returns? 
 
    In this sub-section we investigate whether post-event abnormal returns are systematically 
different for small and large firms, and for value and growth stocks. We also investigate whether the 
result for the full sample that qualitative warnings are followed by more negative abnormal returns 
than quantitative warnings is robust. We first report abnormal returns in the announcement window 
in Table 6. 
 
[ Table 6 ] 
 
     Table 6 shows that the initial impact of profit warnings is very much greater for small firms than 
large. We also see that for small firms, qualitative warnings have a much larger initial impact than 
quantitative warnings. Table 6 shows that growth stocks are hit harder by profit warnings than value 
stocks, and this is particularly true for qualitative warnings.  
  
    [ Table 7] 
 
    Table 7 shows that post-event abnormal returns are always more negative for small firms than for 
the full sample. This is consistent with other studies that find post-event abnormal returns are more 
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significant for small firms than for large firms (see e.g., Chan, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; 
Brav, Geczy, and Gompers, 2000). In particular it complements the results of Bernard and Thomas 
(1989) who find that abnormal returns following earnings announcements were more significant for 
smaller firms. On the other hand, whether a firm is a value or a growth stock does not appear to 
make a substantial systematic difference to subsequent abnormal returns. 
 
     Table 7 shows post-event abnormal returns are less negative for the largest firms than for the full 
sample. Nevertheless for qualitative warnings they are still a statistically significant -8% over three 
months. However there is no evidence in post-event abnormal returns of underreaction to 
quantitative warnings from the largest decile of firms.  
 
     Table 7 also shows that the result for the full sample that qualitative warnings are followed by 
more negative post-event abnormal returns than quantitative warnings is robust. It is true for the 
largest and smallest deciles and value and growth quintiles. 
   
    Tables 6 and 7 show that qualitative warnings are really very bad news for small firms, and much 
worse news than quantitative warnings from small firms. Despite a CAR of -30.1% in the 
announcement window, the BHAR is a further -34.5% in the next six months following a qualitative 
warning. A small firm that issues a quantitative warning loses 24% in the announcement window 
and only a further 7.6% in the next six months. This confirms the judgment for the full sample that 
qualitative warnings appear to be chosen when the earnings surprise, relative to expectations 5 days 
before the warning, is relatively large.  
 
   4.4. Abnormal returns in the twelve months prior to a profit warning 
     Abnormal returns reported in this sub-section are for a sample constructed with the hindsight that 
a warning was eventually issued and therefore no inferences can be made about the performance of 
markets prior to the warning. Any abnormal returns found cannot be interpreted as a profitable 
trading opportunity. Nevertheless it is of interest to see the performance of firms that issue profit 
warnings in a long-term context. For example, do profit warnings come as a complete surprise or do 
they follow a string of negative public and/or private signals, and if so for how long on average has 
the market been receiving negative news about these firms? Abnormal returns prior to warnings will 
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contribute some evidence on these questions. 
 
    In Table 8 abnormal returns are reported for the sample of warning stocks commencing 260 
trading days, or twelve months, before the warning. Table 8 shows that the market starts to get 
signals of a problem approximately six months before a profit warning is issued. In the three months 
preceding the warning announcement window, stocks loose approximately 25% of their value. 
Clearly the market has been receiving signals of problems at these firms for some time before the 
warning was issued.  
 
 [ Table 8] 
 
5. Discussion and summary 
 
A puzzling feature of stock returns is the robust result that momentum trading appears to be 
profitable. It is not easy to explain this result as a failure to properly control for risk, but it has been 
suggested that it can be explained by a systematic underreaction of markets to new information. 
However the underreaction hypothesis is itself contentious. Profit warnings have several 
characteristics that suggest that testing for post-event abnormal performance will contribute useful 
new evidence on the reaction of markets to public news. Profit warnings are a pure information 
event, have a very large initial impact, and are a signal about a specific and imminent earnings 
realization. If the initial reaction is biased, then these characteristics imply that the correction should 
be relatively large and quick. This should yield results that are less sensitive to the problems that 
plague the measurement of long-term abnormal returns, including that of specifying a model of 
normal returns.   
 
     In the case of qualitative warnings these advantages do indeed lead to a decisive verdict on the 
underreaction hypothesis. Negative abnormal returns of -9.6% are reported in the first three months 
following qualitative profit warnings. It seems unlikely that stocks that have just issued qualitative 
profit warnings could be so much less risky than the reference portfolio of firms, matched by size 
and book-to-market, that a bad model for normal returns could explain an annualized abnormal 
return of -38%. Abnormal returns following quantitative warnings are of smaller absolute size, but 
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still a statistically significant -2.2% over three months. This evidence of underreaction is consistent 
with the observation that firms often need to issue repeated warning for the same quarterly earnings 
announcement.   
 
     The difference between abnormal returns following the two classes of warning implies that 
underreaction is more significant in response to announcements that are simply bad news, without 
precise figures being specified. This is revealing about potential explanations for underreaction. If 
qualitative warnings are viewed as less precise information than quantitative warnings then it points 
towards a particular behavioral model proposed by Daniel et al. (1998) that assumes investors 
exhibit an overconfidence bias. In this model the precision of the public signal is an explicit 
determinant of the underreaction. 
 
    Evidence is reported that qualitative warnings are chosen when the earnings outcome is relatively 
bad, relative to expectations five days before the warning is issued. This leads to the question of 
whether the decision not to include a quantitative forecast in the profit warning reflects deliberate 
strategic management of news-flow. If it does, what is the motivation for such news management? 
For example if the aim is to allow the bad news to emerge gradually over time, then the negative 
post-event abnormal returns indicate that the policy is successful. However articulating a motivation 
for such a policy is not easy. Clearly a useful start would be an investigation of whether the choice 
of quantitative or qualitative warnings can be explained empirically. 
 
     In summary, our results for both classes of warning lend empirical support to the conjecture that 
momentum can be explained by the underreaction of the market to new information. In addition, 
comparing abnormal returns following quantitative and qualitative warnings, the evidence reported 
here suggests that some examples of underreaction can be explained by behavioral models that 
assume overconfident investors who exhibit biases in the perception and processing of new 
information. Our results imply that underreaction is likely to be more significant in the case of 
announcements that are simply bad news, without any specific forecast to anchor expectations.  
 
 
 18
  References 
 
Admati, R., Pfleiderer, P., 2000. Forcing firms to talk: financial disclosure regulation and 
 externalities. Review of Financial Studies 13, 479-519. 
 
Bernard, V.L., and Thomas, J.K., 1989. Post-earnings announcement drift: delayed price 
 response or risk premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 1-36. 
 
Blume, M., Stambough, R., 1983. Biases in computed returns: an application the size effect, 
 Journal of Financial Economics 12, 387-404.  
 
Boot, A., and Thakor, A.V., 2001. The many faces of information disclosure. Review of 
 Financial Studies 14, 1021-1057. 
 
 Brav, A., Geczy, C., Gompers, P.A., 2000. Is the abnormal return following equity issuances 
 anomalous? Journal of Financial Economics 56, 209-249. 
 
Chan, W.S., 2003. Stock price reaction to news and no-news: drift and reversals after headlines. 
 Journal of Financial Economics 70, 223-260. 
 
Conrad, J., Kaul, 1998. An anatomy of trading strategies. Review of Financial Studies 11, 489-519. 
 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security market 
 under-and overreactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839-1885. 
 
Fama, E. F., French, K., 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 
 47, 427-465. 
 
Fama, E. F., French, K., 1996. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Journal of 
 Finance 51, 55-84. 
 
Fama, E.F., 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns and behavioral finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 283-307. 
 
Grossman, S.J., 1981. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product 
 quality.  Journal of Law and Economics 24, 461-483. 
 
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T., 1995. Market reaction to open market share 
 repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181-208. 
 
Ikenberry, D., Ramnath, S., 2002. Underreaction to self-selected news events: the case of stock 
 splits. Review of Financial Studies 15, 489-526. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers:implications for 
 market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65-91. 
 
 19
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 2001. Profitability of momentum strategies: an evaluation of 
 alternative explanations. Journal of Finance 56, 699-720. 
 
Kasznik, R., Lev, B., 1995. To warn or not to warn: management disclosures in the face of an 
 earnings surprise. Accounting Review 70, 113-134. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Warner, J.B., 1997. Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial 
 Economics 43, 301-339. 
 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R., 2000. Uniformly least powerful tests of market efficiency. Journal of 
 Financial Economics 55, 361-389. 
 
Lyon, J.D., Barber, B.M., Tsai, C.L., 1999. Improved methods for tests of long-run abnormal 
 stock returns. Journal of Finance 54, 165-201. 
 
Milgrom, P.R., 1981. Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications. Bell 
 Journal of Economics 12, 380-391. 
 
Roll, R., 1983. On computing mean returns and the small firm premium. Journal of Financial 
 Economics 12, 371-386. 
 
Rouwenhorst, K., 1998. International momentum strategies. Journal of Finance 53, 267-284. 
 
Skinner, D., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research 32, 
 38-60. 
 
 
 20
 Appendix 
Examples of the data as reported on the CNN website are: 
1) Quantitative estimates, in which case the firm makes a forecast that specifies a new 
earnings estimate, for example: 
 
Date Firm Ticker Period End of Prior Estimate Revised Forecast 
25-Jan-00 Sportsman's Guide SGDE Q4 199912 $0.30 $0.13 
04-Jan-99 Arch Coal ACI Q4 199812 $0.09 Breakeven 
31-Jan-00 IPC Holdings IPCR Q4 199912 $0.52 Loss of $0.84 
21-Sep-98 Silicon Gaming, Inc. SGIC Q3 199809 -$0.27 Loss of $0.34 to $0.38 
29-Jun-98 Olsten Corp OLS Q2 199806 $0.20 About $0.11 
20-Jan-99 BellSouth BLS Q1 199812 $0.41 Reduced by about $0.09 
 
2) Qualitative estimates, in which case the firm simply states or implies that current 
expectations are too high without giving explicit guidance on a new figure, for example:  
 
Date Firm Ticker Period End of Prior Estimate Revised Forecast 
13-Mar-98 Alteon ALT Q1 199803 $0.45 Unlikely to reach estimates 
21-May-99 Amcast Industrial AIZ Q3 199905 $0.65 Significantly below estimate 
04-Jan-01 Watchguard Tech WGRD Q4 200012 $0.03 Revs below estimate 
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Fig.1.Number of qualitative and quantitative profit warnings, by quarter, February 15th 1998-
December 31st 2000. Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a forecast for the 
scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are defined to be those                 
that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. 
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Table 1 
 
The distribution of warning firms across industrial sectors. 
 
Percentage of firms that issue profit warnings, February 15th 1998-December 31st 2000, that belong 
to each 2-digit SIC division. IT and Telecom are reported separately from the rest of the Services 
and Transport division. This sample consists of 2013 firms and 429 warnings were qualitative and 
1584 were quantitative. Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a forecast for the 
scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are defined to be those 
that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations.  
 
 
Industry sector Quantitative Warnings Qualitative Warnings 
Agriculture 0.13% 0.00% 
Construction  0.82% 1.17% 
Finance Insurance And Real Estate  8.08% 4.66% 
Manufacturing  45.08% 48.95% 
Mining  1.07% 1.17% 
Retail Trade  8.02% 5.36% 
Services  10.98% 10.96% 
Transport. Electric Gas & Sanitary Services 6.00% 6.76% 
Wholesale Trade  4.92% 3.73% 
IT and Telecom 14.90% 17.25% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
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 Table 2 
 
Distribution of warning stocks across reference portfolios. 
 
Each cell reports the percentage of warning stocks, in the sample February 15th 1998-December 31st 
2000, that belong to each of the 50 size and book-to-market sorted reference portfolios used to 
calculate abnormal returns. The reference portfolios are constructed as described in Section 3. This 
sample consists of 2013 firms and 429 warnings were qualitative and 1584 were quantitative. 
Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a forecast for the scheduled earnings 
announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are defined to be those that only offer the 
guidance that earnings will be below current expectations.  
 
 
 
 BM Quintile  
Size Decile Lowest BM 2 3 4 Highest BM TOTAL 
Panel A: Qualitative Warnings 
SMALL 9.79% 4.43% 3.03% 0.00% 0.00% 17.3 %
2 5.83% 4.43% 0.93% 1.17% 0.00% 12.4 %
3 4.90% 3.73% 4.90% 2.80% 0.47% 16.8 %
4 4.66% 2.10% 2.33% 2.33% 0.23% 11.7 %
5 2.56% 1.17% 1.17% 0.47% 0.70% 6.1 %
6 1.86% 0.70% 1.86% 1.40% 0.00% 5.8 %
7 2.33% 1.63% 0.70% 1.40% 0.70% 6.8 %
8 1.17% 0.93% 0.23% 1.40% 0.70% 4.4 %
9 2.56% 0.70% 0.47% 1.63% 5.36% 10.7 %
LARGE 1.86% 1.17% 1.63% 1.63% 1.86% 8.2 %
TOTAL 37.5% 21.0% 17.3% 14.2% 10.0% 100 %
Panel B: Quantitative Warnings 
SMALL 5.68% 3.47% 1.39% 0.13% 0.06% 10.7 %
2 4.73% 4.48% 2.71% 1.14% 0.13% 13.2 %
3 4.80% 3.22% 3.72% 2.84% 0.44% 15.0%
4 3.72% 2.40% 1.89% 2.59% 0.25% 10.9%
5 3.41% 2.08% 1.96% 1.33% 1.20% 10.0 %
6 2.71% 1.77% 1.14% 1.89% 0.95% 8.5 %
7 2.15% 1.14% 1.26% 1.77% 0.57% 6.9 %
8 1.77% 1.20% 2.02% 0.95% 0.51% 6.4 %
9 1.70% 1.77% 1.64% 1.20% 3.28% 9.6 %
LARGE 1.64% 1.83% 1.58% 2.15% 1.64% 8.8 %
TOTAL 32.3% 23.4% 19.3% 16.0% 9.0% 100%
 
 24
 Table 3 
Elapsed time from profit warning to earnings announcement. 
 
Each cell reports the percentage of profit warnings that lead the scheduled earnings announcement 
by different times, in the sample of warnings issued February 15th 1998-December 31st 2000. A 
month is measured as 21 trading days. Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a 
forecast for the scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are 
defined to be those that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. 
This sample consists of 2013 stocks: 429 warnings were qualitative and 1584 were qualitative. 
 
 
 
 
Time between the warning and the announcement 
Quantitative 
Warnings 
Qualitative 
Warnings 
Less than 1 Month 44.06% 45.44% 
1 to 2 Months 30.46% 39.60% 
2 to 3 Months 10.79% 7.30% 
3 to 4 Months 6.54% 3.28% 
4 to 5 Months 0.84% 1.46% 
More than 5 Months 7.31% 2.92% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
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 Table 4 
Abnormal returns in the announcement window. 
 
Daily abnormal returns for an individual stock are calculated as the daily return on the stock minus 
the daily return on the reference portfolio to which it is matched, by size and book-to-market, for the 
sample of firms that issued warnings, February 15th 1998-December 31st 2000. This sample consists 
of 2013 firms: 429 warnings were qualitative and 1584 were quantitative. AR measures the daily 
average abnormal returns for an equally-weighted portfolio of warning stocks. Days are measured 
relative to the day of the warning. CAR records the cumulated value of AR up to each day, starting 
from day -5. Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a forecast for the scheduled 
earnings announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are defined to be those that only 
offer the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. The significance of t-statistics 
for AR at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. CARs are 
significant at the 1% level for all days later than -5. 
 
 
  All  Qualitative Warnings  Quantitative Warnings 
Day  AR CAR  AR  CAR  AR  CAR 
-5 Mean -0.61%  -0.61%  -0.72%  -0.72%  -0.58%  -0.58% 
 St. Dev 4.90%  4.90%   6.59%   6.59%  4.33%  4.33% 
 t-stat -5.61 ***       -5.61  -2.27 **        -2.27  -5.36 ***        -5.36 
-4 Mean -0.65%  -1.26%  -0.74%  -1.47%  -0.63%  -1.21% 
 St. Dev 4.84%  6.92%  6.07%   8.78%  4.44%  5.98% 
 t-stat -6.03 ***       -8.17  -2.53 ***       -3.47  -5.60 ***        -8.05 
-3 Mean -0.81%  -2.07%  -1.23%  -2.69%  -0.69%  -1.90% 
 St. Dev 4.75%  8.53%  5.36%  10.49%  4.56%  7.45% 
 t-stat -7.62 ***     -10.90  -4.73 ***        -5.31  -6.04 ***       -10.15 
-2 Mean -0.98%  -3.05%  -1.11%  -3.80%  -0.95%  -2.85% 
 St. Dev 5.22%  10.06%  6.38%     -12.21%  4.86%  8.79% 
 t-stat -8.42 ***    -13.61  -3.59 ***        -6.45  -7.74 ***      -12.90 
-1 Mean -1.23%  -4.28%  -1.30%  -5.10%  -1.21%  -4.06% 
 St. Dev 6.64%  12.05%  8.26%  14.37%  6.13%  10.66% 
 t-stat -8.32 ***     -15.95  -3.26 ***         -7.35  -7.86 ***      -15.16 
0 Mean -8.50%  -12.78%  -10.03%  -15.13%  -8.08%  -12.14% 
 St. Dev 14.27%  18.36%  15.90%  21.63%  13.77%  17.37% 
 t-stat -26.72 ***     -31.25  -13.05 ***       -14.49  -23.36 ***       -27.82 
1 Mean -8.53%  -21.31%  -8.80%  -23.93%  -8.46%  -20.60% 
 St. Dev 15.38%  24.92%  16.83%  27.89%  14.97%  22.99% 
 t-stat -24.87 ***     -38.40  -10.82 ***       -17.77  -22.47 ***      -35.66 
2 Mean 0.12%  -21.19%  0.22%  -23.70%  0.09%  -20.51% 
 St. Dev 6.71%  25.56%  7.73%  28.47%  6.41%  23.75% 
 t-stat 0.78      -37.22  0.60        -17.24  0.54        -34.37 
3 Mean -0.07%  -21.26%  -0.01%  -23.72%  -0.09%  -20.60% 
 St. Dev 6.09%  25.89%  6.85%    29.39%  5.87%  24.51% 
 t-stat -0.52      -36.87  -0.03         -16.72  -0.59        -33.45 
4 Mean -0.07%  -21.34%  -0.54%  -24.26%  0.05%  -20.54% 
 St. Dev 5.43%  26.36%  5.88%  29.88%  5.30%  25.02% 
 26
 t-stat -0.6112      -36.35  -1.91 *       -16.82  0.40        -32.67 
5 Mean -0.39%  -21.72%  -0.61%  -24.87%  -0.33%  -20.87% 
 St. Dev 5.22%  26.87%  5.83%  30.43%  5.04%  25.61% 
 t-stat -3.33 ***     -36.29  -2.17 **       -16.93  -2.58 ***       -32.43 
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Table 5 
Buy-and-hold and cumulated abnormal returns from 2 days after a warning up to six months after the 
warning, for the sample of stocks that issued profit warnings February 15th 1998-December 31st 
2000.  
 
This sample consists of 2013 firms: 429 warnings were qualitative and 1584 were quantitative. The 
BHAR for an individual stock is calculated as the buy-and-hold return on the stock minus the 
average buy-and-hold return on the reference portfolio to which it is matched by size and book-to-
market, as described in equation (1). BHAR measures average buy-and-hold abnormal returns on the 
sample of stocks that have issued profit warnings, measured from two days after the warning, up to 
successive months following the warning. A month is measured as 21 trading days. The CAR for an 
individual stock is calculated as the cumulated daily abnormal return. The daily abnormal return is 
calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the average daily return on the reference portfolio to 
which it is matched by size and book-to-market. Monthly CARs reported below are the average of 
individual stock CARs up to successive months following the warning. Quantitative warnings are 
defined as those that include a forecast for the scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. 
Qualitative warnings are defined to be those that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below 
current expectations. Conventional t-statistics are shown, as well as the skewness-adjusted t-statistic, 
denoted s-a t-stat, calculated as described in equation (4). The p-value represents the probability of a 
realization more negative than that observed, under the null of no abnormal performance, using 
bootstrapped pseudoportfolios as described in Section 3. The significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  CAR  BHAR 
Month   
Qualitative 
Warnings 
Quantitative 
Warnings   
Qualitative 
Warnings 
Quantitative 
Warnings 
M1 Mean -1.36%  0.38%   -1.26%  0.47%  
 St. Dev 26.67%  18.99%   27.43%  19.59%  
 t-stat -1.05  0.80   -0.94  0.95  
 s-a t-stat -1.02  0.80   -0.89  0.97  
M2 Mean -6.61%  0.13%   -7.13%  0.33%  
 St. Dev 33.31%  26.08%   28.82%  26.35%  
 t-stat -4.10 *** 0.19   -5.12 *** 0.50  
 s-a t-stat -4.32 *** 0.19   -4.94 *** 0.50  
M3 Mean -8.51%  -2.19%   -9.59%  -1.98%  
 St. Dev 42.56%  33.16%   36.66%  33.80%  
 t-stat -4.14 *** -2.63 ***  -5.42 *** -2.32 *** 
 s-a t-stat -4.27 *** -2.63 ***  -4.71 *** -2.25 ** 
 p-values      0.01  0.05  
M4 Mean -7.55%  -1.32%   -8.95%  -1.23%  
 St. Dev 48.71%  38.38%   45.91%  42.51%  
 t-stat -3.20 *** -1.36   -4.03 *** -1.15  
 s-a t-stat -3.30 *** -1.35   -3.53 *** -1.12  
 28
M5 Mean -7.48%  -1.95%   -7.69%  -1.96%  
 St. Dev 53.33%  43.35%   71.81%  51.15%  
 t-stat -2.90 *** -1.78 *  -2.21 ** -1.52  
 s-a t-stat -2.89 *** -1.78 *  -1.67  -1.43  
M6 Mean -9.35%  -1.94%   -11.78%  -1.66%  
 St. Dev 56.69%  48.54%   60.36%  54.89%  
 t-stat -3.41 *** -1.59   -4.04 *** -1.20  
 s-a t-stat -3.45 *** -1.59   -3.20 *** -1.16  
 p-values    0.00  0.11  
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Table 6 
 
Abnormal returns in the announcement window for extreme size deciles and book-to-market 
quintiles. 
 
In panel A abnormal returns are reported for the smallest decile and largest decile of stocks in the 
sample of firms that issued warnings, February 15th 1998-December 31st 2000. The decile of 
smallest stocks that issued qualitative warnings consists of 74 firms. The decile of largest stocks that 
issued qualitative warnings consists of 35 firms. The decile of smallest stocks that issued quantitative 
warnings consists of 170 firms. The decile of largest stocks that issued quantitative warnings consists 
of 140 firms.  In panel B abnormal returns are reported for the quintiles of stocks with the lowest and 
highest book-to-market in the sample of firms that issued warnings, February 15th 1998-December 
31st 2000. The quintile portfolio with the lowest book-to-market of firms that issued qualitative 
warnings consisted of 161 firms. The quintile portfolio with the highest book-to-market of firms that 
issued qualitative warnings consisted of 43 firms. The quintile portfolio with the lowest book-to-
market of firms that issued quantitative warnings consisted of 512 firms. The quintile portfolio with 
the highest book-to-market of firms that issued quantitative warnings consisted of 143 firms. Daily 
abnormal returns for an individual stock are calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the 
daily return on the reference portfolio to which it is matched by size and book-to-market.  AR 
measures the daily average abnormal returns for the equally-weighted decile/quintile portfolio of 
warning stocks. CAR records the cumulated value of AR up to each day. Quantitative warnings are 
defined as those that include a forecast for the scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. 
Qualitative warnings are defined to be those that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below 
current expectations. Days are measured relative to the day of the warning. For AR the significance 
of t-statistics at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
. 
  
 
Panel A: Extreme Size Deciles 
  Qualitative Warnings  Quantitative Warnings 
  Smallest Largest  Smallest Largest 
Day  AR CAR AR CAR  AR CAR AR CAR 
-5 Mean -1.22%  -1.22% -0.55%  -0.55%  -1.07%  -1.07% -0.36%  -0.36% 
 St. Dev 6.33%  6.33% 3.18%  3.18%  5.03%  5.03% 3.27%  3.27% 
 t-stat -1.67 *    -1.67 -1.03      -1.03  -2.80 ***     -2.80 -1.35      -1.35 
-4 Mean -0.45%  -1.66% 0.03%  -0.52%  -0.06%  -1.12% -0.46%  -0.82% 
 St. Dev 9.29%  10.45% 3.04%  4.25%  5.09%  7.06% 2.72%  4.12% 
 t-stat -0.41     -1.40 0.06      -0.70  -0.15      -2.06 -2.00 **     -2.21 
-3 Mean -1.79%  -3.45% 0.67%  0.16%  -1.44%  -2.56% -0.47%  -1.29% 
 St. Dev 6.21%  12.64% 3.55%  5.49%  4.81%  8.37% 2.67%  4.79% 
 t-stat -2.47 ***    -2.38 1.14      0.22  -3.91 ***     -4.10 -2.14 **     -3.09 
-2 Mean -1.13%  -4.58% -0.18%  0.02%  -1.99%  -3.55% -0.57%  -1.86% 
 St. Dev 9.93%  16.12% 3.21%  6.38%  5.90%  9.82% 2.98%  5.46% 
 t-stat -0.98     -2.45 -0.32      0.08  -2.17 **     -4.70 -2.32 **     -3.97 
-1 Mean -1.85%  -6.43% -0.23%  -0.25%  -1.10%  -4.65% -0.82%  -2.68% 
 St. Dev 7.65%  18.13% 2.48%  6.72%  7.15%  12.11% 3.02%  6.42% 
 t-stat -2.09 **    -3.04 -0.57      -0.26  -2.00 **     -5.01 -3.26 ***     -4.80 
 30
0 Mean -9.34%  -15.78% -7.33%  -7.59%  -8.85%  -13.50% -5.46%  -8.14% 
 St. Dev 15.87%  24.17% 9.98%  11.87%  15.00%  19.23% 9.16%  11.23% 
 t-stat -5.09 ***    -5.62 -4.38 ***     -3.79  -7.70 ***     -9.26 -7.08 ***     -8.22 
1 Mean -10.23%  -26.01% -2.61%  -10.20%  -9.96%  -23.46% -3.10%  -11.25% 
 St. Dev 19.72%  31.47% 10.14%  15.55%  16.17%  25.08% 8.36%  14.16% 
 t-stat -4.46 ***     -7.11 -1.52      -3.88  -8.05 ***     -12.36 -4.42 ***     -9.02 
2 Mean -0.76%  -26.76% -0.65%  -10.85%  -0.85%  -24.32% 0.05%  -11.20% 
 St. Dev 8.46%  32.54% 2.81%  15.67%  8.96%  26.61% 3.37%  14.51% 
 t-stat -0.77      -7.08 -1.40      -4.08  -1.24      -12.05 0.16      -8.80 
3 Mean -0.92%  -27.68% -0.39%  -11.23%  -0.24%  -24.56% -0.48%  -11.68% 
 St. Dev 7.04%  33.21% 3.07%  16.02%  8.23%  27.67% 3.03%  14.81% 
 t-stat -1.12      -7.18 -0.76      -4.16  -0.38      -11.73 -1.901 *     -9.01 
4 Mean -1.97%  -29.64% -0.16%  -11.40%  -0.33%  -24.89% -0.07%  -11.74% 
 St. Dev 6.93%  33.98% 2.70%  16.21%  7.31%  28.68% 2.85%  15.07% 
 t-stat -2.43 ***     -7.49 -0.35      -4.14  -0.58      -11.45 -0.28      -8.85 
5 Mean -0.47%  -30.11% -0.84%  -12.24%  0.37%  -24.51% -0.24%  -11.98% 
 St. Dev 9.19%  35.01% 2.83%  16.47%  7.84%  29.75% 2.89%  15.29% 
 t-stat -0.43      -7.40 -1.77 *     -4.38  0.62      -10.86 -1.01      -8.95 
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Table 6 [cont.] 
 
 
Panel B: Extreme Book to Market Quintiles, denoted BM 
  Qualitative Warnings  Quantitative Warnings 
  Lowest BM Highest BM  Lowest BM Highest BM 
Day   AR CAR AR CAR  AR CAR AR CAR 
-5 Mean -0.37%  -0.37% -0.40%  -0.40%  -0.49%  -0.49% -0.57%  -0.57% 
 St. Dev 8.71%  8.71% 8.20%  8.20%  4.82%  4.82% 4.47%  4.47% 
 t-stat -0.53      -0.53 -0.34      -0.34  -2.30 **     -2.30 -1.69 *     -1.69 
-4 Mean -1.20%  -1.57% 0.33%  -0.08%  -0.49%  -0.98% -1.16%  -1.72% 
 St. Dev 7.93%  11.75% 6.48%  10.40%  5.12%  7.00% 3.34%  5.19% 
 t-stat -1.92 *     -1.73 0.35      -0.07  -2.16 **     -3.08 -4.13 ***     -3.65 
-3 Mean -2.14%  -3.71% 0.48%  0.40%  -0.70%  -1.68% -0.06%  -1.78% 
 St. Dev 6.49%  13.38% 5.46%  11.72%  4.88%  8.49% 3.93%  6.49% 
 t-stat -4.24 ***     -3.52 0.61       0.23  -3.305 ***     -4.31 -0.17      -3.09 
-2 Mean -1.23%  -4.94% 0.05%  0.46%  -1.05%  -2.72% -0.87%  -2.65% 
 St. Dev 8.09%  15.59% 6.92%  13.60%  5.45%  10.06% 4.72%  8.01% 
 t-stat -1.95 *     -4.00 0.05       0.25  -4.37 ***     -5.78 -2.22 **     -3.61 
-1 Mean -2.47%  -7.40% 1.31%  1.77%  -1.61%  -4.33% -1.01%  -3.65% 
 St. Dev 8.47%  17.71% 14.30%  19.73%  6.40%  11.93% 4.78%  9.29% 
 t-stat -3.74 ***     -5.32 0.64       0.63  -5.72 ***     -7.77 -2.53 ***     -4.44 
0 Mean -12.43%  -19.84% -8.45%  -6.68%  -9.08%  -13.41% -7.61%  -11.26% 
 St. Dev 17.41%  24.83% 17.07%  26.05%  14.9%  19.08% 12.10%  15.25% 
 t-stat -9.08 ***     -10.15 -3.48 ***     -1.76  -13.81 ***    -15.12 -7.49 ***     -8.25 
1 Mean -10.37%  -30.20% -9.74%  -16.41%  -10.51%  -23.92% -6.75%  -18.02% 
 St. Dev 16.70%  29.92% 16.96%  31.05%  17.11%  25.62% 13.26%  20.17% 
 t-stat -7.87 ***     -12.85 -4.02 ***     -3.62  -13.93 ***    -20.09 -6.11 ***     -9.94 
2 Mean 0.90%  -29.30% -1.45%  -17.86%  0.15%  -23.77% -1.00%  -19.02% 
 St. Dev 9.24%  31.30% 4.73%  31.40%  6.38%  26.39% 6.17%  21.07% 
 t-stat 1.25      -11.91 -2.15 **     -3.91  0.54     -19.43 -1.97 **    -10.04 
3 Mean -0.30%  -29.61% -1.08%  -18.94%  -0.10%  -23.86% -0.78%  -19.80% 
 St. Dev 7.53%  32.19% 7.05%  32.17%  5.96%  27.04% 5.54%  21.78% 
 t-stat -0.51      -11.70 -1.08      -4.03  -0.36      -19.04 -1.69 *    -10.12 
4 Mean -0.12%  -29.72% -0.43%  -19.37%  0.22%  -23.64% -0.08%  -19.88% 
 St. Dev 7.28%  32.98% 5.99%  32.71%  5.82%  27.63% 5.93%  22.57% 
 t-stat -0.20      -11.46 -0.50      -4.07  0.85     -18.38 -0.16     - 9.82 
5 Mean -0.85%  -30.57% -1.13%  -20.51%  0.06%  -23.58% -1.00%  -20.88% 
 St. Dev 7.07%  33.72% 6.69%  33.37%  6.41%  -28.39% 4.29%  22.95% 
 t-stat -1.55      -11.55 -1.19      -4.21  0.20      -17.91 -2.83 ***    -10.14 
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Table 7 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns from w+2 to six months after the warning for extreme size deciles 
and book-to-market quintiles in the sample of stocks that issued profit warnings, February 15th 
1998-December 31st 2000. 
 
The decile of smallest stocks that issued qualitative warnings consists of 74 firms. The decile of 
largest stocks that issued qualitative warnings consists of 35 firms. The decile of smallest stocks that 
issued quantitative warnings consists of 170 firms. The decile of largest stocks that issued 
quantitative warnings consists of 140 firms. The quintile portfolio with the lowest book-to-market of 
firms that issued qualitative warnings consisted of 161 firms. The quintile portfolio with the highest 
book-to-market of firms that issued qualitative warnings consisted of 43 firms. The quintile portfolio 
with the lowest book-to-market of firms that issued quantitative warnings consisted of 512 firms. 
The quintile portfolio with the highest book-to-market of firms that issued quantitative warnings 
consisted of 143 firms. Quantitative warnings are defined as those that include a forecast for the 
scheduled earnings announcement to which they refer. Qualitative warnings are defined to be those 
that only offer the guidance that earnings will be below current expectations. BHAR for an 
individual stock is calculated as the buy-and-hold return on the stock minus the average buy-and-
hold return on the reference portfolio to which it is matched by size and book-to-market, as 
described in equations (1). BHAR measures sample average buy-and-hold abnormal returns on the 
sample of stocks that have issued profit warnings, measured from two days after the warning, up to 
successive months following the warning. The significance of t-statistics at levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  Qualitative Warnings    Quantitative Warnings  
      Smallest         Largest         Smallest      Largest  
Panel A: BHAR Extreme Size Deciles 
M1 Mean -2.67%  -2.05%   -2.61%  -0.04%  
 St. Dev 39.26%  12.50%   24.58%  11.08%  
 t-stat -0.58  -0.96   -1.38  -0.04  
M2 Mean -15.03%  -1.89%   -4.07%  2.61%  
 St. Dev 31.15%  13.75%   32.23%  14.23%  
 t-stat -4.15 *** -0.81   -1.64 * 2.173 ** 
M3 Mean -18.01%  -7.96%   -6.77%  0.57%  
 St. Dev 37.56%  18.04%   43.37%  20.16%  
 t-stat -4.12 *** -2.61 ***  -2.03 ** 0.33  
M4 Mean -21.10%  -5.24%   -7.63%  1.02%  
 St. Dev 43.85%  24.53%   54.47%  24.95%  
 t-stat -4.14 *** -1.26   -1.82 * 0.48  
M5 Mean -25.00%  -1.68%   -12.78%  1.44%  
 St. Dev 56.38%  28.62%   65.55%  27.80%  
 t-stat -3.81 *** -0.34   -2.54 *** 0.61  
M6 Mean -34.51%  -4.71%   -7.64%  0.90%  
 St. Dev 51.07%  32.35%   84.53%  30.08%  
 t-stat -5.81 *** -0.86   -1.17  0.35  
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Panel B: Extreme Book to Market Quintiles, denoted BM 
               Qualitative Warnings  Quantitative Warnings 
            Lowest BM Highest BM  Lowest BM Highest BM 
M1 Mean -1.23%  -5.08%   1.72%  -2.21%  
 St. Dev 28.49%  20.97%   19.43%  23.48%  
 t-stat -0.54  -1.69 *  2.00 ** -1.12  
M2 Mean -7.30%  -5.55%   2.02%  -4.04%  
 St. Dev 33.43%  32.80%   29.71%  28.79%  
 t-stat -2.77 *** -1.18   1.53  -1.67 * 
M3 Mean -8.92%  -6.86%   -2.13%  -5.98%  
 St. Dev 43.58%  44.41%   39.02%  33.66%  
 t-stat -2.59 *** -1.08   -1.23  -2.12 ** 
M4 Mean -7.36%  -9.51%   -1.47%  -4.76%  
 St. Dev 56.71%  52.91%   50.36%  42.36%  
 t-stat -1.64 * -1.25   -0.65  -1.34  
M5 Mean -3.63%  -8.28%   -3.02%  -7.42%  
 St. Dev 102.78%  58.90%   59.89%  43.61%  
 t-stat -0.44  -0.98   -1.14  -2.03 ** 
M6 Mean -10.67%  -14.41%   -1.60%  -8.54%  
 St. Dev 81.77%  47.13%   67.38%  47.32%  
 t-stat -1.65 * -2.14 **  -0.53  -2.15 ** 
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Table 8 
 
Quarterly buy-and-hold abnormal returns on the sample of stocks that issued profit warnings 
February 15th 1998-December 31st 2000, starting twelve months before the warning. 
 
This sample consists of 2013 firms. BHAR for an individual stock is calculated as the buy-and-hold 
return on the stock minus the average buy-and-hold return on the reference portfolio to which it is 
matched by size and book-to-market, as described in equation (1). BHAR measures average buy-
and-hold abnormal returns on the sample of stocks that have issued profit warnings, from an initial 
date 12 months before the profit warning was issued up to the end of successive quarters, measured 
as 65 trading days. Returns in Q4 are measured up to 5 days before the warning. The significance of 
t-statistics at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
                                  
 
Quarter  BHAR  
Q1 Mean 2.64%  
 St. Dev 45.70%  
 t-stat 2.5902 *** 
Q2 Mean -0.76%  
 St. Dev 61.50%  
 t-stat -0.5578  
Q3 Mean -6.85%  
 St. Dev 77.02%  
 t-stat -3.9890 *** 
Q4 Mean -24.99%  
 St. Dev 90.76%  
 t-stat -12.3528 *** 
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